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And Real Estate Development:
Death Knell for Shell Corporations?
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "shell corporation" typically refers to a corporation
which is used only for a limited purpose, and which hopefully will
not be recognized or respected for other purposes such as taxation.
Historically, shell corporations have been used to circumvent usury
laws when adequate financing is not available at an interest rate
permitted to individuals,' to facilitate estate planning,2 to keep
property out of the reach of creditors of its beneficial owners,3 to
satisfy certain state and local laws that require publicly financed
projects to be held by corporations, 4 to avoid personal liability
during liability-prone periods such as construction of a real estate
development, and to serve many other purposes.5
The use of a shell corporation presents a considerable dilemma
to the beneficial owner of property in his role as taxpayer. The
limited purpose for which a corporation is used is almost always
to obtain a privilege which state law does not give to individuals,
but corporate existence involves adverse federal income tax conse-
quences. This dilemma flows from the fact that the corporation
is a creature of legislative grace. The law permits individuals and
other entities to join together and assume a favored legal status,
but exacts a "fee" in exchange. On the state level, this "fee" re-
1. See, e.g., Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973). NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 45-101 (Reissue 1974) (repealed 1975); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 45-101.04
(Cum. Supp. 1976). It is unnecessary to use a shell corporation to
avoid usury laws in Nebraska. The current statute provides that
partnerships are exempt from the maximum rate limitation applicable
to individuals. See also notes 6-13 and accompanying text infra.
2. See, e.g., Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1960).
3. See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. Shapiro, Tax Planning for Equity Financing by Real Estate Develop-
ers, 50 TAXES 530, 542 (1972).
5. See Kronovet, Straw Corporations: When will they be recognized;
what can and should be done, 39 J. TAx. 54 (1973).
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lates primarily to the regulation of the relationship between the
parties to the agreement to incorporate as well as requiring organi-
zational and operational formalities. The federal government
influences the operation of a corporation by the taxation of its
income. The corporation must pay a federal income tax as an en-
tity separate from and in addition to the federal income tax paid by
its shareholders. 6
It may be more advantageous from a tax standpoint for the
developer to hold property either individually or in a partnership
rather than in a corporation.7 A partnership provides a flexible
alternative. Liability may be limited by the use of a limited part-
nership, to the extent permitted under state law,8 thus providing
a major advantage over individual ownership of the property. In
addition, a partnership is not a taxable entity,9 so there is a pass-
through of income and expense items to each partner ° and each
may claim partnership losses to the extent of basis."
In spite of the advantages of using a noncorporate entity to
hold property during the construction phase of a development, it
is usually essential to assume the corporate form to obtain needed
funds. The one statutory exception to double taxation which is
allowed to certain classes of corporations, a Subchapter S election,'
2
may not be available to the real estate developer."
6. The corporation is generally subject to a federal income tax as an en-
tity separate from and in addition to its shareholders. I.R.C. § 11.
Only certain corporations are able to take advantage of the pass
through of corporate income and expense which is considerable under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. See notes 12-13 infra.
7. The developer incurs the following tax risks in his attempts to treat
the corporate titleholder as a mere shell. The transfer of property
between corporate and noncorporate entities solely for the purpose of
obtaining financing may subject its beneficial owners to a capital gain
tax on the retransfer of property which has appreciated in value during
the period in which it was held by the corporation. This would be
either a short term or long term capital gain, depending on the length
of time that the corporation held the property. I.R.C. §§ 301(c) (3),
1001. The retransfer of property to its beneficial owner may result in
double taxation, first to the corporation on its income, and then to the
shareholder when he receives what may be construed as a dividend in
kind. I.R.C. §§ 11, 301. In addition, any deductible item which is
attributed to a corporation with no income will be lost. See also
Kronovet, supra note 5, at 54.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-201, 67-217, 67-222 (Reissue 1971); UNIFORM LiM-
ITED PARTNERsHIP AcT §§ 1, 17, 22 (1967).
9. I.R.C. § 701.
10. I.R.C. § 702.
11. I.R.C. § 704.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
13. In order to qualify for the pass through of corporate income and ex-
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The foregoing considerations have led many taxpayers to treat
the corporations which they are forced to use as mere shells, with
the hoped-for result that they will not be recognized for tax pur-
poses. This commentary will examine the history and use of shell
corporations in light of this problem, with special emphasis on the
Tax Court's recent decision in Strong v. Commissioner. 14
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historically, taxpayers have attempted to avoid the taxation of
shell corporations by resorting to two major doctrines. First, the
"sham" approach urged disregard of the corporate entity for tax
purposes if the corporation did not carry on a business activity.
This approach was discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.'5 Second, the "agency"
approach urged that if the corporation was a mere agent of the
beneficial owners of the property, it was only entitled to a fee for
serving in that capacity and was not charged with the tax conse-
quences of beneficial ownership of property. This approach was
discussed by the Court in National Carbide Corp. v. Commission-
er.'
6
Moline Properties involved the use of a shell corporation as a
security device for real property owned by its sole shareholder. The
property was conveyed to the corporation which assumed the out-
standing mortgages, and the shareholder received stock in ex-
change. The real property was the only asset held by the corpo-
pense items to the shareholders under these provisions, it is necessary
that the corporation receive not more than 20% of its income from
passive investments. I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5) (A). The construction phase
of the development raises no problem in this regard. Although there
is normally no income produced during the construction phase, net op-
erating losses are generated which may pass through to the sharehold-
ers. I.R.C. § 1374. After construction has been completed, the major
source of income becomes rental, which typically is classified as
passive investment income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (1969). This
prevents the corporation from continuing to utilize Subchapter S.
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5) (A).
In addition, the restrictions placed the corporation which elects un-
der Subchapter S may make this option undesirable. Only individuals
and estates, I.R.C. § 1371 (a) (2), who have filed timely elections with
the Service, I.R.C. § 1372(c) (1), may be shareholders and they may
number no more than ten. I.R.C. § 1371(a) (1). If a partnership or
another corporation invested in this venture, or if the developers
broadened the investment base by admitting more shareholders, the
Subchapter S election would terminate. Id.
14. 66 T.C. 12 (1976).
15. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
16. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
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ration. The stock was subsequently transferred to a voting trustee
appointed by the mortgagee, and served as security for an addi-
tional loan made to the shareholder. When the loan was paid off,
the shareholder regained control of the stock, and paid off the mort-
gage liability by selling some of the real property. The rest of the
property was sold later, and the proceeds were deposited in the in-
dividual account of the shareholder.
The Court held that gain from the sale of the property was
chargeable to the corporation rather than its shareholder. The de-
cision turned on the fact that during its existence the corporation
conducted "business," which included: (1) the assumption of a
certain obligation of its shareholder to a creditor; (2) the defense
of certain condemnation proceedings and the institution of suit to
remove restrictions imposed on the property by a prior owner, even
though the expenses of the suit were paid by the shareholder; and
(3) the leasing of a portion of its property as a parking lot. Neither
books nor bank accounts were maintained. The Court stated:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in busi-
ness life. Whether the purpose be to gain advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the
demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undis-
closed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.' 7
This broad holding deflated many taxpayers' assertions that
corporations they controlled were mere shams, to be disregarded
for tax purposes.
The agency approach was briefly mentioned and rejected in the
Moline Properties decision. The Board of Tax Appeals had found
that the corporation "was a mere figmentary agent which should
be disregarded in the assessment of taxes."' s The Supreme Court
based its reversal of the Board on the fact that there was no agency
contract and the lack of "the usual incidents of an agency relation-
ship."19
The petitioners in National Carbide were three wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Air Reduction Corporation (AIRCO). The Service
asserted deficiencies against the corporation for income taxes and
declared value excess profits taxes for the year 1938. Petitioners
argued that they were agents of the parent corporation, and conse-
quently that any tax on their income was property chargeable to
the parent corporation.
17. 319 U.S. at 438-39 (footnotes omitted).
18. 45 B.T.A. 647, 650 (1941).
19. 319 U.S. at 440.
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Petitioners were organized and used as operating companies in
the four major fields of business of the parent company. Each sub-
sidiary operated strictly as an agent of AIRCO20 and each was given
responsibility to manage and operate plants and to market the prod-
ucts it manufactured. AIRCO supplied working capital, executive
management and office facilities. Each subsidiary's fee for oper-
ation and management was limited by contract to six per cent on
its outstanding stock, with all excess returning to the parent.
During the year in question, the total amounts retained as income
by the subsidiaries was $1,350, while AIRCO showed net earnings
of nearly $4.5 million.21 AIRCO showed all appropriate amounts
returned to it by the subsidiaries as income.
Petitioners contended that the Moline Properties holding of
taxability where the corporate entity engaged in business activity
was inapplicable where a corporation was the agent of its owner.
They relied on an earlier Supreme Court holding in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Lowe,22 but the Court distinguished the Southern
20. 336 U.S. at 424. The substance of the subsidiary-parent contract was
as follows:
Airco hereby employs Sales as its agent to manage and
operate, during the term of this contract, all plants for the
production of oxygen, acetylene and other gases and for the
manufacture of apparatus and containers for the utilization
and transportation of such gases ... ; and likewise employs
Sales as its agent to market and sell, during the term of this
contract, the output of all such plants .... Airco agrees(1) to give Sales the use of all cylinders, containers, motor
trucks, equipment and shipping facilities, which it now owns
or may hereafter acquire; (2) to supply such working capital
as Sales may need; (3) to provide such executive manage-
ment ... as may be necessary for the proper conduct of Sales
business .... Sales agrees (1) to manage and operate ...
all of said plants; (2) to maintain the same in first class con-
dition . .. ; (3) to distribute, market and sell, the product
manufactured in said plants as efficiently as possible ... ;(4) to pay all expenses of such operation, maintenance and
selling, and to discharge all expenses or liabilities incurred
therein or thereby and to collect all accounts receivable or
other proceeds resulting therefrom; (5) to credit monthly on
its books to Airco all profits accruing to it from the operation
of its entire business over and above an amount equal to six
per cent (6%) per annum on its outstanding capital stock,
which said amount it is hereby authorized to deduct and re-
tain, and it hereby agrees to accept as full compensation for
its services hereunder; and (6) to pay over to Airco upon de-
mand any profits becoming due and credited to Airco as afore-
said.
Id. at 424 n.1.
21. Id. at 438.
22. 247 U.S. 330 (1918). Income earned by a wholly owned subsidiary
prior to the effective date of the Income Tax Act of 1913 was attributed
to the parent, owing to complete domination of the subsidiary by the
parent. Id. at 337.
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Pacific decision on the ground that the term "agent" as used in
the earlier opinion was not intended in the technical sense of a
principal-agent relationship, but as a means by which the Southern
Pacific Court described its disregard of the corporate entity.23 As
such, it was equivalent to the "sham" theory repudiated in the
Moline Properties decision. The Court said that the relationship
between AIRCO and its subsidiaries was the same as the relation-
ship between Moline Properties, Inc., and its sole shareholder, and
raised serious doubt as to whether a corporation could ever be con-
sidered an agent of its sole shareholder:
Undoubtedly the great majority of corporations owned by sole
shareholders are "dummies" in the sense that their policies and
day-to-day activities are determined not as decisions of the cor-
poration but by their owners acting individually .... We reversed
the Board of Tax Appeals in Moline Properties in the face of its
finding that ... [the sole shareholder retained full beneficial
ownership of the underlying property]. 2 4
The Court rejected petitioners' contentions of agency, but left
the door open for "a true corporate agent. . .[to handle] the prop-
erty and income of its owner-principal without being taxable
therefor. ' '25
Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account
of the principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money
received to the principal by, and whether receipt of income is
attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to
assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant consid-
erations in determining whether a true agency exists.26
Litigants attempting to create exceptions to the Moline Prop-
erties and the National Carbide decisions have not fared well in
the courts.2 7  However, taxpayers did score a partial success in
Paymer v. Commissioner,2 8 which compared two corporations
owned by the same shareholder. One corporation was deemed
viable for tax purposes and the other a passive dummy which would
not be taxed. In Paymer, a partnership transferred parcels of real
estate to two corporations to prevent creditors of one of the part-
ners from attaching partnership property. The minutes of the
corporate meetings of each corporation stated: (1) that the corpo-
ration was intended only as a title holding device; (2) that the bene-
23. Id.
24. 336 U.S. at 433-34.
25. Id. at 437.
26. Id. (footnotes omitted).
27. The litigants have heretofore attempted to apply these doctrines to
their fact situations rather than establish new principles. Kronovet,
supra note 5, at 55 n.1.
28. 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
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ficial interests of and the profits from the property were in the
shareholders; and (3) that the corporation was organized solely for
the convenience of the shareholders in the management of the prop-
erty.29 The differing tax treatment was based on the fact that the
leases on the property were never transferred to the corporation
which was deemed passive while the viable corporation obtained
a loan on a lease which was transferred to it. In order to obtain
the loan, the latter corporation covenanted that the leases were
in full force and effect and that it was the sole lessor.3 0 The court
specifically noted that an absence of books, records, offices or a
failure to hold corporate meetings is not decisive on the issue of
business activity.31 A comparison of the taxable and nontaxable
corporations in Paymer supports the proposition that the only time
a corporation will be disregarded for tax purposes under the Moline
Properties doctrine is when it serves no corporate business purpose
with respect to the property it holds, but only takes and holds title
to such property.32
Paymer and subsequent decisions3" have been careful to note
that the business purpose in question must be one which is germane
to the functioning of the corporation. The Moline Properties test
becomes: Is the corporation required to carry out any functions
with respect to the property transferred to it in order to carry out
the business purpose of the beneficial owners? If the answer is
"yes" the corporation will, much more often than not, be charged
with the beneficial ownership of the property and the consequent
tax burdens.
An obvious exception to this rule surfaces in situations where
the corporation is deemed a true agent of the beneficial title-
holders.34 Another safe harbor for taxpayers is the situation where
29. Id. at 336.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 337.
33. Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626
(Ct. Cl. 1973); Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956).
34. Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233, 239 (Ct. Cl. 1969). But see
Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960); Har-
rison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627 (Ct.
CL. 1973). The distinction is whether the corporation is governed by the
principal-agent relationship with the beneficial owner of the property
or whether the corporate acts are the usual incidents of a close corpo-
ration-shareholder relationship. For a discussion of National Carbide,
see text accompanying notes 20-26 supra. In connection with this
issue, the clear implication is that it is the very rare case where a
close corporation will be deemed to be the agent of its shareholders,
but may act on behalf of an independent third party.
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the intended business purpose is not effected.3 5 The result is the
same as that of the nontaxable corporation in Paymer-the corpo-
ration merely holds title to the property in question and is not
charged with beneficial ownership.
Assuming that a shell corporation is found to have a "business
purpose" within the meaning of the Moline Properties doctrine, how
much activity will be necessary to charge it with beneficial owner-
ship of property? Mere taking and holding of title to property,
without more, usually will not result in a tax being assessed on
the corporation. Britt v. United States36 stated that "[b]usiness
activity is required for recognition of the corporation as a separate
taxable entity; the activity may be minimal."3" Although courts
have not consistently held that a corporation which engages in any
business activity will be deemed a taxable entity, 3 there have been
enough cases to dissuade many taxpayers from using a shell corpo-
ration if other alternatives are available.
A related doctrine stated in Higgins v. Smith,3 9 pervades the
entire area of the taxation of shell corporations. The Service need
not always accept the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction
or entity in question:
A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his affairs as he
may choose and having elected to do some business as a corporation,
he must accept the tax advantages.
On the other hand, the Government may not be required to
acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for doing business
which is most advantageous to him. The Government may look at
actualities and upon determination that the form employed for
doing business . . . is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard
the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax
statute.4
0
Thus, a taxpayer is stuck with his decision regardless of whether
it best suits all of his business purposes, while the Service is af-
35. In National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944), a
corporate taxpayer transferred securities to a shell corporation solely
for the effectuation of a plan of reorganization that was rejected. The
corporation performed no function with respect to such property ex-
cept to hold it and return title to the beneficial owner after the failure
of the plan. The Second Circuit found that the loss accruing with re-
spect to the securities belonged to the beneficial owner of the property.
The corporate owner had attempted to place the loss on the shell, but
the court disallowed this action, holding that escaping taxation was
not business in the ordinary sense of the word. Id. at 468.
36. 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. Id. at 237.
38. See note 43 and accompanying text infra,
39. 308 U.S. 473 (1940),
40. Id. at 477.
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forded flexibility in the enforcement of the revenue laws. This
treatment is consistent with the previously discussed decisions re-
garding the sham and agency approaches. "It is command of income
and its benefits which marks the real owner of property."41 When
considered in light of the anticipatory assignment of income doc-
trine42 this rule makes perfect sense. When applied to taxation of
shell corporations, however, it leaves the door open for the tax-
payers to assert that shareholders and not the corporation should
be taxable on the income which nominally rests in the shell corpo-
ration. Higgins was overruled on this point by Moline Properties.
A recent case, Bolger v. Commissioner43 was decided in favor of
the taxpayer, however, and seemed to rely to a great degree on
Higgins. In Bolger, the taxpayer organized corporations to acquire
title to properties, issue promissory notes secured by mortgages, and
execute leases on the properties. Immediately upon completion of
the foregoing steps, usually within one day, the properties were con-
veyed to individuals, subject to the leases and debts. The Tax Court
held specifically that the corporations were viable taxable entities
and were not true agents, citing Moline Properties and National
Carbide 4 But the court went on, without citing Higgins, to hold
that the transferees of the properties were the true owners, and
thus were entitled to the depreciation deductions.
Notwithstanding a favorable decision for the shareholder trans-
ferees, Bolger solidified the Service's position regarding the sham
and agency theories. Prior to Bolger, most tax practitioners be-
lieved that a transaction of this type which was completed within
one day was an unwritten exception to the Moline Properties and
National Carbide doctrines. 43 It is now clear that this exception
does not exist.
III. THE FACTS OF STRONG
The facts of Strong v. Commissioner46 present a common at-
tempt by individuals to avoid New York's usury statute.4 7 Seeking
to obtain adequate financing for the construction of an apartment
complex, they used the medium of a corporate borrower, while
trying to retain beneficial ownership of the underlying real prop-
erty in a partnership.
41. Id. at 478 (footnote omitted).
42. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940); I.R.C. §§ 446(b) (2), 446 (b) (4).
43. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
44. Id. at 766.
45. Kronovet, supra note 5, at 54.
46. 66 T.C. 12 (1976).
47. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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Prior to September, 1967, the petitioner and other individuals
formed a partnership to develop an apartment complex. Financing
was unavailable at the maximum rate of interest which could le-
gally be charged to natural persons,48 and the partnership was not
a separate entity exempt from the usury laws.49 Corporations were
exempt.5 0
The decision to form a corporation owned by the partnership
to obtain financing was reached in September, 1967. The intention
of the parties at all times was to retain beneficial ownership of
the apartment complex and the underlying realty in the partner-
ship. The parties entered into a formal partnership agreement on
December 18, 1967. The agreement provided that certain of the
partners were to transfer a parcel of real property "to the partner-
ship or its nominee"5 1 and stated further that:
It is agreed that title to the aforesaid Parcel [of land] be held by
a corporate nominee for the benefit of the partnership, it being the
intention of the parties hereto that at all times the real and bene-
ficial owner of the said Parcel shall be the partnership. 52
The partners also agreed that the partnership would enter into a
construction agreement with the nominee corporation, for which
the plans and specifications would be prepared on behalf of the part-
nership. A second agreement between the parties, substantially
similar in its terms to the first, was executed on the same day, and
provided for the transfer of two additional parcels of real estate
to the partnership.5 3
The first parcel was deeded to the corporation on December 27,
1967. Two days later, a building loan agreement and mortgage on
this parcel was entered into between the corporation as mortgagor
and Chemical Bank New York Trust Company as mortgagee. The
corporation represented that (1) it was a corporation in good
standing; (2) it had been duly authorized to enter into the loan
agreement; and (3) it owned the property and that any assignment
of the property by it without the consent of the lender was an event
of default. 4
Upon completion of the apartments on the first parcel, they were
leased to tenants and the partnership was named as landlord.55 In-
48. 66 T.C. at 14.
49. See note 1 supra.
50. Id.
51. 66 T.C. at 15.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 15-16.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 17.
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surance was obtained to guard against destruction of the buildings
and loss of rents in December, 1968, with the corporation as the
named insured. One year later, the policy was amended to include
the partnership as a named insured.56 One last loan was made to
the corporation in February, 1969 to facilitate the completion of con-
struction on the first parcel.
Similar arrangements were made with respect to the financing
of the development of apartments on the second and third parcels.
In December, 1969, the situation changed. A memorandum by
one of the partners directed that "the only time the title will rest
in the Corporation will be at the moment an advance is made.' 57
All three parcels were to be conveyed immediately to the partner-
ship, deeded to the corporation only for the purpose of securing
advances, and immediately reconveyed to the partnership. "IRS
considerations" were stated as the motivation for such actions. Since
the original conveyances from the partnership, legal title to the
three parcels had rested continuously in the corporation.5 8
This conveyance-reconveyance arrangement continued until
May, 1970, when the parcels were conveyed to the partnership by
warranty deed with full covenants, which was recorded promptly.59
During the development period, the corporation was involved
only in the financing of the projects. The partnership took all
material actions with respect to the development of the complexes.
Permits were issued to the partnership, it granted necessary ease-
ments, and handled all other details. Advances from lenders were
credited to the corporation's account, and transferred by check to
the partnership. The only departures from this procedure occured
when time was of the essence and it was necessary to transfer the
advances directly to the contractor. All other receipts and dis-
bursements were by the partnership, and so reflected on its books.
The corporation kept no books other than the ones which pertained
to its advance accounts. No capital stock was issued by the corpo-
ration, and it held no meetings and maintained no minutes. Federal
income tax returns were filed which listed its business as "nominee
corporation"; but no income, loss, assets or liabilities were reported.
With the exception of the real property, no other partnership assets
ever were transferred to the corporation. It was dissolved in 1973.
Net operating losses with respect to the development of the apart-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Parcel 2 was deeded to the corporation in May 1969, and Parcel 3
was deeded in June 1969. Id. at 18.
59. Id. at 19.
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ment complexes were sustained in 1965, 1966, 1968 and 1969.60 The
losses were reported on the tax returns of the partnership and the
individual returns of the partners as distributive shares. The Service
disallowed the losses to the partnership and the partners. Litigation
followed in the Tax Court and the Service's position was affirmed in
all respects.
IV. THE STRONG OPINION
The Tax Court's opinion in Strong represented a logical step in
a progressively broadened view by the Service toward the taxation
of shell corporations. Petitioners made two allegations. First, they
argued that the corporation was a sham whose ownership of the
real property should have been disregarded for tax purposes.6'
Second, they argued that the corporation was a nominee of its share-
holders. The nominee approach was reminiscent of the agency doc-
trine, but had little support in the facts.62
The Tax Court first dealt briefly with the accepted practice in
New York of using shell corporations to avoid usury laws, citing
60. The sources of the losses in the two earlier years were not discussed
in the opinion.
61. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
62. The only indications that the corporation was intended as an "agent"
of its shareholders as that term was used in National Carbide v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 442 (1949), are the following: (1) the partnership
agreement of December 18, 1967 stated that title to Parcel 1 "may be
held by a corporate nominee for the benefit of the partnership" 66 T.C.
at 15; and (2) similar statements reaffirming the intention of the par-
ties to treat the corporation as a nominee upon conveyance of Parcels
2 and 3 to the partnership. Id. at 9.
This is far different from the observations of one commentator who
suggested the following procedure in order to assure "agency" treat-
ment by the Internal Revenue Service where the corporation is or-
ganized to circumvent usury laws: (1) form a shell corporation, but
no beneficial owners of the property should act as incorporators, or
be shareholders, officers or directors; (2) have the articles of incorpo-
ration state a limited purpose-that of a corporate agent; (3) do not
observe corporate formalities, i.e., hold no meetings, adopt no by-laws,
etc.; (4) file tax returns but show no income other than an agent's
fee; and (5) draft a detailed agency agreement which includes the fol-
lowing elements: (a) the beneficial owners are the true owners of
the property and the corporate agent's only purpose is to obtain a loan
(or the like); (b) the corporation shall only perform ministerial func-
tions with the beneficial owners retaining full control of the property;
(c) the loan obtained shall be placed in an account for the benefit
of the beneficial owner who shall have exclusive control over it; (d)
the property shall be reconveyed to the beneficial owners on demand.
Tilley, Dummy Corporations for Real Estate Holding Purposes: Taxa-
tion and Technique, 33 Tsx. B.J. 445, 451-52 (1970).
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Hoffman v. Lee Nashaa Motors" and Leader v. Dinkier Manage-
ment Corp.,0 4 two decisions of that state's highest court. In the
Leader decision, the New York Court of Appeals denied the usury
defense in spite of a finding by the lower court that "the loan . . .
was made to appellant ... individually, though in form to a corpo-
ration in order to hide the fact that . . . [the lender] exacted an
illegal rate of interest."0 5 The test in Leader focused on whether
the loan was in form made to a corporation,"" ignoring the sub-
stance of the transaction.
The Tax Court's response was a half-hearted acceptance of the
reality of the situation: "There is no doubt that petitioners sought
to do business in partnership form and that the corporation was,
at least in their eyes, a mere tool or conduit. Their argument is
not without some appeal, but ... it should not be accepted." 67
The Moline Properties doctrine0 8 set the parameters for the dis-
cussion in Strong. The court found that the avoidance of state
usury laws was a "business purpose" within the meaning of Moline
Properties.9 The doctrine was restated in dictum, when the Tax
Court found that income from property was taxable to its corporate
owner "unless the corporation is a purely passive dummy."7  The
line of cases cited to support this statement gives some indication
of the types of activities which are considered to constitute a "busi-
ness purpose" and thus result in taxation to the corporation. Use
of a corporation (1) for efficient management of property in the
event of the death of one of its beneficial owners,7 1 (2) to mask
the identity of a beneficial owner,7 2 or (3) to avoid usury laws7 3
constitutes a business purpose. On the other hand, the mere hold-
63. 20 N.Y.2d 513, 231 N.E.2d 765, 285 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1967).
64. 20 N.Y.2d 393, 230 N.E.2d 120, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1967).
65. Id. at 398, 230 N.E.2d at 122, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
66. Id. at 399, 230 N.E.2d at 122, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
67. 66 T.C. at 21.
68. See notes 15-19 nd accompanying text supra.
69. 66 T.C. at 24. The court relied on the Moline Properties and Bolger
cases and the decision in Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17
(S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975), to
establish this point. The Collins case was the only one which directly
stated that the avoidance of state usury laws constituted a "business
purpose" within the meaning of Moline Properties. 386 F. Supp. at
21.
70. 66 T.C. at 22.
71. Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626
(Ct. Cl. 1973).
72. Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1971).
73. Collins v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), af 'd per
curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ing of title to securities as part of a plan of reorganization which
eventually fails does not constitute a business purpose.7 4
In light of the authorities that have followed Moline Properties,
the Tax Court's treatment of shell corporations is typical. As far
as the "business purpose" doctrine is concerned, Strong added
nothing new.
The Tax Court did state that a claim of nontaxability of the
entity by the shareholders of a close corporation would be subject
to close scrutiny. 5 This follows directly from the National Carbide
decision,7 6 which stated that although it is often difficult to deter-
mine whether a close corporation is the agent or the alter ego of
its shareholders, the corporation will be taxed as a separate entity7 7
unless strong evidence of a true corporate agency is present.78 An
even stronger case for the Service's position exists in the situation
where there is no claim of corporate agency.
The court considered and rejected the suggestion of one com-
mentator that the "situs of real beneficial or economic ownership,"
rather than the viability of the corporate entity should be con-
trolling.7 9 This recommendation comports with the view expressed
in Higgins ° and Bolger.81
The apparently significant difference between the Strong case
of nontaxability and the Bolger decision is difficult to see. Bolger
expressly stated that the Moline Properties8 2 and National Car-
bide8 3 doctrines were applicable in a case where all of the corporate
functions were performed within a short period of time followed
by an immediate reconveyance of the properties to the share-
holders/beneficial owners. But the determination that the share-
holders were the beneficial owners of the property seems to have
rested on the same grounds. The only differences in the present
case are (1) the fact that the principals in the Bolger case were
actively engaged in real estate investment and finance,8 4 while in
the present case the corporation was only used to finance one pro-
ject, and (2) the fact that the corporate dealings throughout the
74. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
75. 66 T.C. at 22.
76. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
77. 336 U.S. at 434.
78. Id. at 437. See note 63 supra.
79. 66 T.C. at 22.
80. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
84. 59 T.C. at 761.
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history of the Bolger transactions consisted almost entirely of one-
day-in-one-day-out conveyances to and from the corporations,8 5
while the petitioners in Strong decided to resort to this approach
only late during the last tax year in issue after it was determined
that it might be critical for tax purposes.8 6 The major difference
in the two cases relates to the second issue, concerning beneficial
ownership of property.
The role approach to corporate financing transactions, discussed
in the foregoing paragraph has received some support from com-
mentators but not by courts.s7 For example, one writer has sug-
gested discarding the present determinative factors 8 in favor of
such a role approach. Rather than asking whether a corporation
is a shell for tax purposes, the question would be posed in terms
of "whether a corporation's formal relationship to a particular prop-
erty or transactions should be disregarded as dummy ownership or
as a sham transaction."8 9  Although this restructured analysis of
the problem initially would create a new issue for taxpayers to
litigate, the impact on the Service and the courts could be lessened
through codification of this approach with a consequent analysis
by the Service through treasury regulations and revenue rulings.
The Tax Court did address this alternative in Strong, however,
stating briefly that the door is open for a corporation to argue that
it is a mere straw with respect to a particular transaction.90 Its
shallow approach to this alternative leaves at least two questions
unanswered. First, in the area of real estate investment and fi-
nance, the corporation is often obligated to represent that it is the
beneficial owner of the land in question, as well as to pledge leases
executed to it as additional security for advances. Assuming that
a lender will demand such representations and actions when large
sums of money are borrowed, the shell corporation nearly always
will be considered more than a "dummy" with respect to transac-
85. Id.
86. 66 T.C. at 18.
87. See Watts, Tax Problems of Regard for the Corporate Entity, 20 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX. 867 (1962).
88. The major stakes in present litigation turn on whether the corporation
is a viable entity or whether it is a true agent.
89. Watts, supra note 87, at 868.
90. The adoption of this approach would necessarily change one of the
basic premises inherent in the tax treatment that the Internal Revenue
Code accords to corporations. With a few exceptions in statute (i.e.,
the Subchapter S election) and in practice (corporations may be disre-
garded for tax purposes if the motive of the shareholders is tax avoid-
ance) the Corporation and its shareholders are viewed exclusively
from the standpoint that they are separate taxable entities. Watts,
supra note 87, at 868.
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tions such as occurred in Strong. Second, while the court in the
present case reasonably accurately represents that corporate acti-
vity will be a determinative factor in deciding whether to tax the
corporation or the beneficial owners on the property, several de-
cisions have inexplicably held for the taxpayer where a good deal
of corporate activity exists.9 1
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrines developed in case law since Moline Properties have
been, for the most part, well reasoned and consistent. The Tax
Court's decision in Strong was no exception. If Strong added any-
thing to the case law, it extended Bolger92 by taxing a corporation
when title to real estate was vested therein for only a short period
of time.93
Taxpayers have been apprised of the possible, if not probable,
consequence of using shell corporations to serve functions that only
corporations can serve, if those functions constitute a "business
purpose." Taxation at the corporate level is likely to result. This
knowledge does not solve the taxpayers' problem, however, because
state usury laws still exist.
The Treasury should take steps to remedy what has heretofore
been the inequitable treatment of the taxpayer who is forced to
use the shell corporation. Congress could enact legislation which
would allow for some type of election by taxpayers so that they
could retain the beneficial ownership of property and its consequent
tax burdens and benefits which must be transferred to a shell
corporation. The proposed election would be available only where
state law expressly or in effect requires a corporate entity and
where there is no good reason to require the use of such an entity.
An alternative would be for the Treasury Department to issue
91. See Kronovet, supra note 5, at 55-56.
92. See K-C Land Company, Inc., 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 209 (1960). In this
case a corporation acquired title to numerous properties, transferred
title, issued stock, kept corporate records, executed mortgages, bor-
rowed and repaid money, paid operating expenses and was disre-
garded for tax purposes. Alan S. Davis, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 825 (1970)
and Noonan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 907 (1969) both allowed a dis-
regard of the corporate entity where the purpose was essentially one
of tax avoidance. See also Kronovet, supra note 5, at 55.
93. Kronovet would probably dispute the importance and possibly the ac-
curacy of this conclusion. He states: "Experience indicates that the
avoidance of usury may be the single most important reason for using
a straw corporation. Accordingly, an inference is possible that the
Commissioner is not prone to challenge situations in which a corpora-
tion is used for this purpose." Kronovet, supra note 5, at 56.
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regulations, revnue rulings or revenue procedures providing that
corporations will not be taxed or favorable ruling issued if the
beneficial owners of property follow stated procedures with re-
spect to their financing transactions. Finally, a mass repeal of
state usury statutes would solve the problem and the need for any
action by the Service. Although this would be the cleanest alter-
native from the standpoint of corporate financing, it would create
some degree of hardship on the small individual borrower. A re-
lated solution would be to repeal usury statutes where the amount
in question is higher than a stated dollar figure, thus avoiding the
hardship.
Robert L. Nefsky '77
